Eyck Freymann | AI and Strategic Stability: A Framework for U.S.–China Technology Competition
Strategic stability exists when neither side thinks it can improve its strategic outcome by striking first.
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Strategic stability exists when neither side thinks it can improve its strategic outcome by striking first.
HAI faculty offer independent critique of the AI debates of the moment.
HAI faculty offer independent critique of the AI debates of the moment.
This seminar pairs a case study of AI diffusion with an organizational approach to technological changes in the workplace.
This seminar pairs a case study of AI diffusion with an organizational approach to technological changes in the workplace.
Sessions run Wednesdays from 4:30–5:30 PM in CoDa E160. Each session features a different Stanford speaker; talk titles are announced by the organizers.

Sessions run Wednesdays from 4:30–5:30 PM in CoDa E160. Each session features a different Stanford speaker; talk titles are announced by the organizers.
Today, strategic stability is increasingly important and potentially fragile. Nuclear weapons are no longer the only technology that threatens a state with devastation. AI competition and emergent AI capabilities could challenge strategic stability in many ways, including offensive and defensive cyber operations, sensing, ballistic missile defense, and intelligence / counterintelligence operations.
This talk will provide a detailed account of how AI, nuclear deterrence, and semiconductor interdependence jointly shape strategic stability in U.S.–China competition. From there, the seminar will make the case that AI introduces both new deterrence tools and new threats to strategic stability, especially through its effects on cyber operations, intelligence, and command-and-control.